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The 2015 Countershock and the Prospects for a Low-
carbon Energy Transition
By Duccio Basosi and Riccardo Basosi*
The Incipient Energy Transition and the Downfall of Oil Prices
For some years now, the need for a transition to a low-carbon economy has been recognized globally 
as a crucial element of any credible attempt to prevent the expected increase in global temperature from 
exceeding pre-industrial levels by more than 2° C. As is well known, according to the United Nations 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a large majority of scientists, beyond this threshold, 
rising temperatures may trigger potentially catastrophic and irreversible effects.1 At the global level, the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997 endorses the objectives of “the enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant 
sectors of the national econom[ies]” and “research on, and promotion, development and increased use of 
new and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of advanced and 
innovative environmentally sound technologies”.2 These objectives have also been endorsed by most 
relevant state participants. For example, the United States and China, the two largest economies in the 
world, issued a joint statement in this regard on 12 November of 2014, stressing their “longer range ef-
fort to transition to low-carbon economies”.3 On its part, the European Union has passed legislation to 
“reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% of 
consumption, and achieve energy savings of 20% or more” by the year 2020.4
The timing and feasibility of the transition are contested by the main energy companies and oil-
producing countries which continue to expect both an absolute growth of global energy consumption 
and a dominant role for fossil fuels for decades to come.5 Nevertheless, many analysts from different 
backgrounds see bright prospects both for energy saving and efficiency, and for the growth of renewable 
energy sources in the energy mix: for example, based on the actual reduction of energy use per unit of 
global GDP in recent years, former ENI Director of Strategy and Development, Leonardo Maugeri, has 
defined energy efficiency6 As for renewables, the authoritative IRENA, based in Abu Dhabi, estimates 
that these could cover 36% of global energy consumption by 20307 In any case, between 2005 and 2015, 
the capacity of wind and photovoltaic power has increased by 9 and 36 times, respectively, surpassing 
any forecasts made at the beginning of the millennium.8 
However, commentators have noted that such an incipient energy transition took place during a period 
of relatively high prices of oil, the raw material that still represents about 30% of world energy consump-
tion and virtually all energy consumption in the transportation sector. Beginning their increase around 
the year 2000, crude oil prices touched 147 $/b in 2008 and, after a sharp but brief fall in 2009, stabilized 
around 110 $/b between 2010 and 2014. In the second half of 2014, prices began to fall, down to 47 $/b 
in January 2015 (followed by a partial recovery up to about 60 $/b in May when we are writing this). In 
this context, various commentators have expressed the view that, if the regime of low oil prices were to 
stabilize, the energy transition would be jeopardized by the lack of incentives for energy saving measures 
and the weakened cost competitiveness of renewable energies.9
Oil Prices and the Energy Transition: Theoretical and Empirical Frameworks
That there is a relationship between the trend in crude oil prices and the prospects of sustainable 
energy solutions is a well established fact.10 In part, such a relationship is a direct one as far as the trans-
portation sector is concerned. It is easy to surmise, for example, that lower fuel costs can lead individuals 
to opt for higher consumption, while automakers, shipbuilders and aircraft manufactures could adopt 
less stringent standards in energy saving measures (including a possible slowdown of the development 
of electric and hybrid cars). On the other hand, the relationship is also an indirect one, to the extent that 
natural gas and coal prices generally move in the same direction of those of oil 
(indeed, gas prices are in part indexed on crude oil prices). While oil now covers 
only a residual percentage of electric power generation and heating, the fall in 
oil prices can result in the increased competitiveness of natural gas and coal in 
these sectors, with negative effects on energy saving in general and with penal-
izing consequences for the development of wind, thermal solar and photovoltaic 
power.
The experience of the first countershock in oil prices, in 1986, seems to con-
firm this pattern – indeed, to a certain extent, it is its archetype. In the second half 
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of the 1980s, absolute oil consumption began to rise again after a five-year break;11 energy saving trends 
slowed down;12 government subsidies to renewable energy development shrank globally.13 
In the current framework, it has been estimated that oil prices below 70/80 $/b would disincentivize 
energy efficiency, while oil prices below 70 $/b would make many investments in renewable energies 
financially problematic.14 In short, one should conclude that the energy transition is put at risk by the 
current fall in oil prices.
However, if this is the theoretical framework, it seems appropriate to reflect also on the dynamics 
that led to the recent fall in oil prices. Most analysts agree that the 2014 price decrease was the result 
of several factors: on the demand side, stagnation in Europe and Japan and the slowdown of the growth 
rates of emerging economies (in particular China); on the supply side, the boom in unconventional oil 
production from shale oil, tar sands and deep offshore fields. As for the price collapse of the latter part of 
the year, however, all observers agree that it depended on Saudi Arabia’s decision not to play the role of 
swing producer, and to start a price war instead (against the shale oil industry, against Russia and Iran, 
or both, depending on interpretations).15 In short, as has often been the case in the past, today supply 
and demand interact with the (geo-)political choices of some particularly influential participants on the 
market. Forecasts on how long the price war could last vary. However, the partly “political” nature of the 
recent slump seems to rule out the possibility that the price will stabilize around 50 $/b. Both the futures 
market and many analysts indicate a likely price around 70/80 $/b for the near future, reflecting the no-
tion that the exhaustion of the resource is not imminent, but the trend towards increasing extraction costs 
is a fact.16 In short, if the recovery of crude oil prices from their lows in January 2015 were to be con-
solidated, the room for competitiveness of energy efficiency and renewables should grow in proportion.
Lessons From the 1986 Countershock
Regardless of “how low” (or “how high”) the future price of oil will be, there are other elements 
to be taken into consideration when assessing the prospects of the energy transition, which make the 
picture less deterministic. Also from this point of view the experience of 1986 seems to provide much 
food for thought. Indeed, it is undeniable that the countershock in oil prices represented, in that context, 
an incentive to boost oil – and more generally fossil energy – consumption. And yet, it is useful to note 
that such a recovery of the fossil paradigm was also the product of a successful political and cultural 
counteroffensive, which affected deeply the demand side of the equation. Such a counteroffensive was 
most radical in the United States, the most technologically advanced country, whose economy alone ac-
counted for a quarter of the world economy. Here, during the presidential campaign of 1980, the debate 
on future energy choices assumed a symbolic character that largely transcended the theme of energy per 
se: according to Republican candidate Ronald Reagan, who was to come out on top, giving up oil meant 
in fact to “give in” to OPEC, to increase the perceived vulnerability of the United States, to abjure the 
principles of the market economy, or even to give up the freedom of movement guaranteed by private 
cars. In short, the battle to change the country’s energy policies, undetaken by president Jimmy Carter a 
few years earlier, was now depicted successfully as alien to the “American way of life” (although Carter 
himself had been very keen on presenting it as a quintessentially American endeavour, comparable to 
the Manhattan Project or the space race). The success of the Reagan counteroffensive manifested itself 
in the strengthening of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force stationed in the proximity of the Per-
sian Gulf, in the drastic cuts to research and development funds on renewable energy and in the virtual 
abolition of the CAFE standards on fuel consumption. At a more symbolic level, Reagan ordered the 
removal of the solar panels installed by the Carter administration on the roof of the White House.17 In the 
other industrialized countries, the assault was less radical but, as an analyst wrote in 1990, everywhere 
the prospects of the energy transition clashed with “the general tightening of government budgets and 
changing national policies in the 1980s”.18 
From this point of view, the interruption of the energy transition that had started in the 1970s can be 
seen as a consequence of the rise of the “neoliberal” ideas that characterized the 1980s. On the other 
hand, in a far-sighted analysis dating from 1987, scientists Paolo Degli Espinosa and Enzo Tiezzi ob-
served how the 1970s discussion about the energy future had been timely, but also flawed by the notion, 
then in vogue, that the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 indicated the imminent depletion of oil reserves (ac-
cording to a well-known study of the CIA from the 1970s, this would have occurred as soon as 1985). To 
the extent that the efforts of the 1970s towards less oil-dependent economies had been built largely on 
this prophetical premise, they could not remain unscathed when the prophecy went unfulfilled.19 What 
seems most relevant here, however, is that the prospects for the development of energy saving measures 
and renewable energies had already been crippled at the time of the 1986 countershock.
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Conclusions
Compared to the 1980s, today the situation seems partially different. Capitalism, especially in its 
“neoliberal” form, does not appear to be in its heyday and is potentially more vulnerable to criticism. In-
ternational public opinion seems to be more attentive to the risks of climate change and finally, as noted 
in the opening of this article, the low-carbon energy transition appears to have been endorsed by many 
governments and international organizations.20 In this context, according to IEA Director Maria van der 
Hoeven, low oil prices could even represent an unexpected opportunity for many countries to introduce 
a carbon tax to encourage energy conservation.21  
It must be said, of course, that in many cases the real will of governments to move from words to 
deeds seems dubious. It also seems appropriate to recall that “green” slogans can be easily hijacked and 
distorted, both by governments in search of soft power and by private companies in search of visibility 
on the cheap. In this context, the mobilization of global environmental movements can represent a cru-
cial factor of pressure and control from below, both about the seriousness of the commitments made at 
the governmental level, and about the speed with which these are turned into consistent policies.
On the road of the low-carbon energy transition there are still many obstacles, both in terms of politi-
cal will, and in terms of technology and infrastructure (suffice it to think of the problems of the electricity 
grids, challenged by the passage from a few large suppliers to many decentralized suppliers from photo-
voltaic plants). If anything, the story of the early 1980s shows that an incipient transition can be stopped 
and reversed and that a fall in oil prices may be an ingredient of the turnaround. At the same time, the 
same story also shows that if low oil prices are not necessarily good news on the way for the transition, 
the factors involved are many and the game remains open. 
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